Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Bidding Models: Effects of Bidders’ Risk Aversion
A revised optimum bidding model is presented which corrects the omission, in previous models, of the way contractors behave when confronting risk. Specifically, the model proposes to use a nonlinear function of profit to reflect the bidders aversion to risk. The need to use such a utility function is demonstrated through the analysis of over 4,400 bids on 858 public projects in Massachusetts during the 1966/75 decade. This evidence indicates that contractors behave differently when dealing with small and large projects, and when operating in good years or bad. They appear most risk averse toward larger projects in lean years, and bid relatively lower. This consideration can be incorporated into the standard bidding models by the simple devise of measuring the utility function of a bidder for a particular project, and inserting it as the measure of value in the formulas that determine the optimum bid.
Bidding Models: Effects of Bidders’ Risk Aversion
A revised optimum bidding model is presented which corrects the omission, in previous models, of the way contractors behave when confronting risk. Specifically, the model proposes to use a nonlinear function of profit to reflect the bidders aversion to risk. The need to use such a utility function is demonstrated through the analysis of over 4,400 bids on 858 public projects in Massachusetts during the 1966/75 decade. This evidence indicates that contractors behave differently when dealing with small and large projects, and when operating in good years or bad. They appear most risk averse toward larger projects in lean years, and bid relatively lower. This consideration can be incorporated into the standard bidding models by the simple devise of measuring the utility function of a bidder for a particular project, and inserting it as the measure of value in the formulas that determine the optimum bid.
Bidding Models: Effects of Bidders’ Risk Aversion
de Neufville, Richard (Autor:in) / Lesage, Yves (Autor:in) / Hani, Elias Nicholas (Autor:in)
Journal of the Construction Division ; 103 ; 57-70
01.01.2021
141977-01-01 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Unbekannt
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