Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Game between Government and Developers under the Subsidy Policy of Prefabricated Buildings
At present, in order to promote the prefabricated construction, the state has formulated a series of government subsidy policies. However, due to the asymmetry and imperfection of information, the equilibrium between government and companies is affected by the cost of fraud and the risk cost of being discovered, while the government is in the inferior position of information asymmetry. This article considers the factors such as the research and development costs of prefabricated construction, the costs under traditional construction methods, the time cost of funds, the impact of goodwill, the cost of fraud, government costs of different monitoring methods, subsidy costs under different subsidy policies, environmental benefits obtained through the use of prefabricated buildings. By using the Bayesian game model, we can analyze the real estate developers’ payout and the government’s payoff and then provide theoretical support to subsidy policy.
Game between Government and Developers under the Subsidy Policy of Prefabricated Buildings
At present, in order to promote the prefabricated construction, the state has formulated a series of government subsidy policies. However, due to the asymmetry and imperfection of information, the equilibrium between government and companies is affected by the cost of fraud and the risk cost of being discovered, while the government is in the inferior position of information asymmetry. This article considers the factors such as the research and development costs of prefabricated construction, the costs under traditional construction methods, the time cost of funds, the impact of goodwill, the cost of fraud, government costs of different monitoring methods, subsidy costs under different subsidy policies, environmental benefits obtained through the use of prefabricated buildings. By using the Bayesian game model, we can analyze the real estate developers’ payout and the government’s payoff and then provide theoretical support to subsidy policy.
Game between Government and Developers under the Subsidy Policy of Prefabricated Buildings
Zhang, Xiying (Autor:in) / Zhang, Shoujian (Autor:in) / Jiao, Shuaishuai (Autor:in)
International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management 2018 ; 2018 ; Charleston, South Carolina
ICCREM 2018 ; 153-160
08.08.2018
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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