Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Institutions, incentives, and the politics of growth management
Paper prepared for the Florida Political Science Association meeting March 23-24, 2001 Jacksonville, FL ; Land use management is relevant to the discussion of environmental policy because regulation of land use and growth has been used as an instrument of environmentally concerned actors. More generally, growth management policy is best characterized as regulatory, because state and local governments use public policy to direct private behavior (Feiock, 1994). It is appropriate to note however that, the consequences of growth management are inherently distributive. Molotch (1976) depicted a city as an aggregate of competing land-based interests. Decisions regarding growth, at the local or any other level, are then decisions of who gets what, where, and how (Lasswell, 1936). These interests refer not only to competition for economic development but also for quality of life under the heading of growth management. In this discussion of land use management policy, I proceed in the following manner. First, I begin by describing the history and evolution of American land use planning activities and policies throughout the XX century. Next, I succinctly describe the land use policy tools employed over the years and the context in which they have been used. In the core of the paper, I apply a transaction cost theory to explain the relationship between states and localities in terms of economic and political transaction costs. I conclude with some suggestions regarding hypothesis and future theory testing.
Institutions, incentives, and the politics of growth management
Paper prepared for the Florida Political Science Association meeting March 23-24, 2001 Jacksonville, FL ; Land use management is relevant to the discussion of environmental policy because regulation of land use and growth has been used as an instrument of environmentally concerned actors. More generally, growth management policy is best characterized as regulatory, because state and local governments use public policy to direct private behavior (Feiock, 1994). It is appropriate to note however that, the consequences of growth management are inherently distributive. Molotch (1976) depicted a city as an aggregate of competing land-based interests. Decisions regarding growth, at the local or any other level, are then decisions of who gets what, where, and how (Lasswell, 1936). These interests refer not only to competition for economic development but also for quality of life under the heading of growth management. In this discussion of land use management policy, I proceed in the following manner. First, I begin by describing the history and evolution of American land use planning activities and policies throughout the XX century. Next, I succinctly describe the land use policy tools employed over the years and the context in which they have been used. In the core of the paper, I apply a transaction cost theory to explain the relationship between states and localities in terms of economic and political transaction costs. I conclude with some suggestions regarding hypothesis and future theory testing.
Institutions, incentives, and the politics of growth management
Tavares, António F. (Autor:in)
01.01.2001
Paper
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
DDC:
710
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