Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain
This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.
Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain
This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.
Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain
Haitao Chen (Autor:in) / Zhaohui Dong (Autor:in) / Gendao Li (Autor:in)
2020
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Unbekannt
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