Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for Plastic Pollution Prevention and Control under the Background of China’s Plastic Ban
Controlling plastic pollution is an important issue in the field of sustainable development and is of great concern for numerous countries’ governments. After investigating the implementation of relevant policies, this paper analyzes the tripartite mainstay under the background of China’s Plastic Ban by constructing an evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises and the public. Through simulation modeling, the paper then investigates the possible regulatory effects of different policies at the micro level. According to the results, the government should pay more attention to how it reacts to enterprises’ compliance strategies, both for the sake of the public and itself. It is vital to increase enterprises’ compliance rewards and decrease their compliance costs through various means such as policy changes and technological innovation. The policy’s effect can be improved if supervision and regulations are both enforced.
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for Plastic Pollution Prevention and Control under the Background of China’s Plastic Ban
Controlling plastic pollution is an important issue in the field of sustainable development and is of great concern for numerous countries’ governments. After investigating the implementation of relevant policies, this paper analyzes the tripartite mainstay under the background of China’s Plastic Ban by constructing an evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises and the public. Through simulation modeling, the paper then investigates the possible regulatory effects of different policies at the micro level. According to the results, the government should pay more attention to how it reacts to enterprises’ compliance strategies, both for the sake of the public and itself. It is vital to increase enterprises’ compliance rewards and decrease their compliance costs through various means such as policy changes and technological innovation. The policy’s effect can be improved if supervision and regulations are both enforced.
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for Plastic Pollution Prevention and Control under the Background of China’s Plastic Ban
Chenlu Ouyang (Autor:in) / Huiqi Jiang (Autor:in) / Qing Sheng (Autor:in) / Guannan Liu (Autor:in) / Minghui Jiang (Autor:in)
2022
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Unbekannt
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