Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings
Environmental degradation is significantly influenced by the construction industry. Energy-efficient retrofitting of existing office buildings has become an effective means of reducing building energy consumption. Implementation of retrofits requires the support and cooperation of stakeholders. However, existing studies on the dynamics of decision-making behavior among stakeholders are still relatively limited. This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, property owners, and end users, to better understand the behavioral evolution and evolutionary stabilization strategies of stakeholders. The results show that: stakeholders’ decision-making behavior has obvious mutual influence; benefits and costs are the dominant factors in stakeholders’ decision making; the effects of government supervision policies depend on the profitability of the project; and government behavior appears to be influenced by public willingness. In addition, targeted countermeasures were proposed for the development of the energy-efficiency retrofit market. This study provides a generic model that fits various contexts and can be used to inform a reference for scientific decision making by stakeholders.
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings
Environmental degradation is significantly influenced by the construction industry. Energy-efficient retrofitting of existing office buildings has become an effective means of reducing building energy consumption. Implementation of retrofits requires the support and cooperation of stakeholders. However, existing studies on the dynamics of decision-making behavior among stakeholders are still relatively limited. This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, property owners, and end users, to better understand the behavioral evolution and evolutionary stabilization strategies of stakeholders. The results show that: stakeholders’ decision-making behavior has obvious mutual influence; benefits and costs are the dominant factors in stakeholders’ decision making; the effects of government supervision policies depend on the profitability of the project; and government behavior appears to be influenced by public willingness. In addition, targeted countermeasures were proposed for the development of the energy-efficiency retrofit market. This study provides a generic model that fits various contexts and can be used to inform a reference for scientific decision making by stakeholders.
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings
Ying Xie (Autor:in) / Yisheng Liu (Autor:in)
2022
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Unbekannt
Metadata by DOAJ is licensed under CC BY-SA 1.0
Energy-efficient retrofitting of office buildings
| Elsevier | 1994
Energy-efficient retrofitting of office buildings
| Online Contents | 1994
Energy-efficient retrofitting of office buildings
| British Library Conference Proceedings | 1994
Sustainable Buildings’ Energy-Efficient Retrofitting: A Study of Large Office Buildings in Beijing
| DOAJ | 2022