A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults: Fid-Bau Portal

Fachinformationsdienst BAUdigital

Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik

A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults

Georg Meran / Reimund Schwarze

This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol–Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and passive choice by subpopulations. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimize the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.

Zugriff

Seitennavigation

Dokumentinformationen

Ähnliche Titel

Exportieren, teilen und zitieren

A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults

Georg Meran / Reimund Schwarze

This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol–Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and passive choice by subpopulations. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimize the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.

A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults

Georg Meran / Reimund Schwarze

This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol–Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and passive choice by subpopulations. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimize the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.

Zugriff

Seitennavigation

Dokumentinformationen

Ähnliche Titel

Exportieren, teilen und zitieren

Dokumentinformationen

Titel:

A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults

Beteiligte:

Georg Meran (Autor:in) / Reimund Schwarze (Autor:in)

Erschienen in:

Sustainability, Vol 10, Iss 8, p 2902 (2018)

Erscheinungsdatum:

2018

ISSN:

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082902

Medientyp:

Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)

Format:

Elektronische Ressource

Sprache:

Unbekannt

Schlagwörter:

nudge , policy mix , behavioural heterogeneity , environmental taxes and subsidies , Environmental effects of industries and plants , TD194-195 , Renewable energy sources , TJ807-830 , Environmental sciences , GE1-350

Metadata by DOAJ is licensed under CC BY-SA 1.0

Ähnliche Titel

Bounding defaults in egress models

Gwynne, Steven M. V. / Kuligowski, Erica / Spearpoint, Michael et al. | Wiley | 2015

Interline defaults on loan repayment

Online Contents | 1996

Bounding defaults in egress models

Gwynne, Steven M.V. / Kuligowski, Erica / Spearpoint, Michael et al. | Tema Archiv | 2015

Bounding defaults in egress models

Gwynne, Steven M. V | Online Contents | 2015

LEASE DEFAULTS AND THE EFFICIENT MITIGATION OF DAMAGES

Miceli, ThomasJ. | Online Contents | 2009