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Coalition Game Approach for Electricity Sharing in Multi-Energy Multi-Microgrid Network
Microgrids have varying load demands and renewable energy generation during a day. The demand-supply mismatch would result in substantial renewable energy curtailment and high energy procurement costs. Interconnected microgrids provide an opportunity to share electricity and information. In this paper, we consider a cooperative multi-energy multi-microgrid (MMG) network where redundant renewable energy is shared between the interconnected microgrids rather than being fed into the main grid. Under the proposed MMG network model, we propose a coalition game-based approach for reducing the costs of microgrids buying electricity and gas from the outside. The Shapley value is used for allocating the coalition costs fairly. This approach lowers the energy buying costs and eliminates microgrids bidding, encouraging microgrids to be a grand coalition. The performance of the proposed approach is verified in case studies of an MMG network formed by three microgrids with different structures. The results show that compared with a non-cooperative setting, each microgrid achieves cost savings in the coalition game.
Coalition Game Approach for Electricity Sharing in Multi-Energy Multi-Microgrid Network
Microgrids have varying load demands and renewable energy generation during a day. The demand-supply mismatch would result in substantial renewable energy curtailment and high energy procurement costs. Interconnected microgrids provide an opportunity to share electricity and information. In this paper, we consider a cooperative multi-energy multi-microgrid (MMG) network where redundant renewable energy is shared between the interconnected microgrids rather than being fed into the main grid. Under the proposed MMG network model, we propose a coalition game-based approach for reducing the costs of microgrids buying electricity and gas from the outside. The Shapley value is used for allocating the coalition costs fairly. This approach lowers the energy buying costs and eliminates microgrids bidding, encouraging microgrids to be a grand coalition. The performance of the proposed approach is verified in case studies of an MMG network formed by three microgrids with different structures. The results show that compared with a non-cooperative setting, each microgrid achieves cost savings in the coalition game.
Coalition Game Approach for Electricity Sharing in Multi-Energy Multi-Microgrid Network
Zhong, Xiaoqing (Autor:in) / Zhong, Weifeng (Autor:in) / Liu, Yi (Autor:in) / Yang, Chao (Autor:in) / Xie, Shengli (Autor:in)
07.09.2021
5683604 byte
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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