Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Fee versus royalty licensing in spatial Cournot competition
Abstract This article investigates the optimal licensing mechanism in a spatial model where competitors set quantities and one firm owns a cost-reducing innovation. We show that when the firms spatially discriminate, the innovator gets higher profits by licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee, whereas in the case of uniform delivered quantities, the innovator prefers licensing by royalties (fixed fee) if and only if it has not (has) a sufficiently strong locational disadvantage with respect to the potential licensee.
Fee versus royalty licensing in spatial Cournot competition
Abstract This article investigates the optimal licensing mechanism in a spatial model where competitors set quantities and one firm owns a cost-reducing innovation. We show that when the firms spatially discriminate, the innovator gets higher profits by licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee, whereas in the case of uniform delivered quantities, the innovator prefers licensing by royalties (fixed fee) if and only if it has not (has) a sufficiently strong locational disadvantage with respect to the potential licensee.
Fee versus royalty licensing in spatial Cournot competition
Colombo, Stefano (Autor:in)
2014
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Englisch
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