Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Social security and strategic inter-vivos transfers of social capital
Abstract This paper explains public provision of social capital in an overlapping generations model with ‘gerontocracy’, without resort to any bequest motive. The old generation has an incentive to provide education and infrastructure because these goods shift the Laffer curve of social security taxation, thereby increasing old-age income in the political equilibrium. The incentive is stronger if population growth is larger. The marginal productivity of social capital in the political equilibrium may exceed or fall short of the marginal productivity of social capital in an efficient allocation.
Social security and strategic inter-vivos transfers of social capital
Abstract This paper explains public provision of social capital in an overlapping generations model with ‘gerontocracy’, without resort to any bequest motive. The old generation has an incentive to provide education and infrastructure because these goods shift the Laffer curve of social security taxation, thereby increasing old-age income in the political equilibrium. The incentive is stronger if population growth is larger. The marginal productivity of social capital in the political equilibrium may exceed or fall short of the marginal productivity of social capital in an efficient allocation.
Social security and strategic inter-vivos transfers of social capital
Konrad, Kai A. (Autor:in)
1995
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Englisch
Knowledge Transfers, Spillovers and Actors: The Role of Context and Social Capital
Online Contents | 2010
|Knowledge Transfers, Spillovers and Actors: The Role of Context and Social Capital
Taylor & Francis Verlag | 2010
|