Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
On financing the internal enforcement of illegal immigration policies
Abstract We introduce a government budget constraint into an illegal immigration model, and show that the effect of increasing internal enforcement of immigration laws on the host country’s disposable national income depends on the mix of employer fines and income taxation used to finance the added enforcement. These issues are addressed under alternative assumptions about (a) the ability of host country employers to discern between legal and illegal workers, and (b) host country labor market conditions. Empirical evidence for the United States indicates that the employer sanctions program may have had a negative impact on disposable national income.
On financing the internal enforcement of illegal immigration policies
Abstract We introduce a government budget constraint into an illegal immigration model, and show that the effect of increasing internal enforcement of immigration laws on the host country’s disposable national income depends on the mix of employer fines and income taxation used to finance the added enforcement. These issues are addressed under alternative assumptions about (a) the ability of host country employers to discern between legal and illegal workers, and (b) host country labor market conditions. Empirical evidence for the United States indicates that the employer sanctions program may have had a negative impact on disposable national income.
On financing the internal enforcement of illegal immigration policies
Bucci, Gabriella A. (Autor:in) / Tenorio, Rafael (Autor:in)
1996
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Englisch
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