Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Mixed duopoly under hotelling with convex production costs
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7501-6432
Abstract Dragone and Lambertini (Reg Sci Urban Econ 84:103568, 2020) show that in a Hotelling duopoly with linear transport cost, sufficiently convex production cost generates an elevated price equilibrium with collocation at the middle. We examine the consequences of a mixed duopoly under these cost assumptions. No equilibrium exists in a mixed duopoly with simultaneous location. Equilibria exist under location leadership. Private firm leadership generates greater welfare than public firm leadership, a result different from previous examinations. A mixed duopoly with a foreign firm generates an equilibrium with firms usually located apart but with the public firm serving all interior customers. This typically increases welfare relative to the fully private market.
Mixed duopoly under hotelling with convex production costs
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7501-6432
Abstract Dragone and Lambertini (Reg Sci Urban Econ 84:103568, 2020) show that in a Hotelling duopoly with linear transport cost, sufficiently convex production cost generates an elevated price equilibrium with collocation at the middle. We examine the consequences of a mixed duopoly under these cost assumptions. No equilibrium exists in a mixed duopoly with simultaneous location. Equilibria exist under location leadership. Private firm leadership generates greater welfare than public firm leadership, a result different from previous examinations. A mixed duopoly with a foreign firm generates an equilibrium with firms usually located apart but with the public firm serving all interior customers. This typically increases welfare relative to the fully private market.
Mixed duopoly under hotelling with convex production costs
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7501-6432
Abstract Dragone and Lambertini (Reg Sci Urban Econ 84:103568, 2020) show that in a Hotelling duopoly with linear transport cost, sufficiently convex production cost generates an elevated price equilibrium with collocation at the middle. We examine the consequences of a mixed duopoly under these cost assumptions. No equilibrium exists in a mixed duopoly with simultaneous location. Equilibria exist under location leadership. Private firm leadership generates greater welfare than public firm leadership, a result different from previous examinations. A mixed duopoly with a foreign firm generates an equilibrium with firms usually located apart but with the public firm serving all interior customers. This typically increases welfare relative to the fully private market.
Mixed duopoly under hotelling with convex production costs
Heywood, John S. (Autor:in) / Li, Dongyang (Autor:in) / Ye, Guangliang (Autor:in)
2022
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
BKL:
83.64$jRegionalwirtschaft
/
74.12
Stadtgeographie, Siedlungsgeographie
/
38.00$jGeowissenschaften: Allgemeines
/
38.00
Geowissenschaften: Allgemeines
/
83.64
Regionalwirtschaft
/
74.12$jStadtgeographie$jSiedlungsgeographie
RVK:
ELIB39
/
ELIB18
/
ELIB45
Lokalklassifikation FBW:
oek 4450
| Online Contents | 2009
| Online Contents | 2009
Analytical solution of a multi-dimensional Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs
| Online Contents | 2009
| Online Contents | 2012
Equilibrium production-location decisions under duopoly
| Online Contents | 1998