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Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources When Self-Insurance is Available
Abstract When a group of users who share a common-pool resource through a system of licenses is exposed to the risk of shortage, there is a need to establish a sharing rule. Such sharing rule is likely to impact the individual decisions to self-insure, i.e., to rely on a secure but costly resource instead of the free but uncertain common-pool resource. We determine the optimal sharing rule and the optimal diversification between the common-pool resource and the safe resource as a function of the agents’ individual characteristics, the distribution of the common-pool resource availability, and the cost of the safe resource. We find that, for a group of agents with heterogenous risk preferences, a perfectly informed regulator can obtain the optimal diversification level by imposing a rationing rule which shares the resource between agents proportionally to their relative risk tolerance. We illustrate and interpret our results in the context of water management in France.
Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources When Self-Insurance is Available
Abstract When a group of users who share a common-pool resource through a system of licenses is exposed to the risk of shortage, there is a need to establish a sharing rule. Such sharing rule is likely to impact the individual decisions to self-insure, i.e., to rely on a secure but costly resource instead of the free but uncertain common-pool resource. We determine the optimal sharing rule and the optimal diversification between the common-pool resource and the safe resource as a function of the agents’ individual characteristics, the distribution of the common-pool resource availability, and the cost of the safe resource. We find that, for a group of agents with heterogenous risk preferences, a perfectly informed regulator can obtain the optimal diversification level by imposing a rationing rule which shares the resource between agents proportionally to their relative risk tolerance. We illustrate and interpret our results in the context of water management in France.
Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources When Self-Insurance is Available
Lefebvre, Marianne (Autor:in) / Thoyer, Sophie (Autor:in) / Tidball, Mabel (Autor:in) / Willinger, Marc (Autor:in)
Environmental Modeling & Assessment ; 19 ; 111-125
17.07.2013
15 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources When Self-Insurance is Available
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