Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
International Environmental Agreements: Design of Optimal Transfers Under Heterogeneity
Abstract International environmental agreements (IEAs) can coordinate abatement of transboundary pollutants. This paper investigates how heterogeneous countries facing a stock pollutant might structure such an agreement. In particular, we examine how an IEA might be implemented with a set of monetary transfers. The focus is on transfers that are time invariant, linear in emissions, and consistent with budget balance. There is a range of such schemes that would induce efficient emissions. We provide a simple and intuitive characterization of these penalties and describe how specific proposals might be chosen in order to facilitate compliance and implementation. Our proposals are illustrated with a simple example. We show that heterogeneity reduces the scope for penalty schemes to jointly satisfy desirable properties.
International Environmental Agreements: Design of Optimal Transfers Under Heterogeneity
Abstract International environmental agreements (IEAs) can coordinate abatement of transboundary pollutants. This paper investigates how heterogeneous countries facing a stock pollutant might structure such an agreement. In particular, we examine how an IEA might be implemented with a set of monetary transfers. The focus is on transfers that are time invariant, linear in emissions, and consistent with budget balance. There is a range of such schemes that would induce efficient emissions. We provide a simple and intuitive characterization of these penalties and describe how specific proposals might be chosen in order to facilitate compliance and implementation. Our proposals are illustrated with a simple example. We show that heterogeneity reduces the scope for penalty schemes to jointly satisfy desirable properties.
International Environmental Agreements: Design of Optimal Transfers Under Heterogeneity
Calcott, Paul (Autor:in) / Petkov, Vladimir P. (Autor:in)
Environmental Modeling & Assessment ; 17 ; 209-220
26.08.2011
12 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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