Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
A One-Stage Model of Abatement Innovation in Cournot Duopoly: Emissions vs Performance Standards
This paper evaluates the comparative performance of emission and performance standards in a one-stage game of abatement R&D and Cournot duopoly, in terms of R&D propensity, output and social welfare. For each standard, firms simultaneously select R&D and output levels, given the standard’s exogenous constraint. A performance standard generates higher R&D investments and output, but lower profit, than the pollution-equivalent emissions standard. The same conclusion extends to social welfare only under high demand. We also conduct a similar comparison for each of the two instruments across the one-stage and the two-stage models. The two-stage model leads to higher levels of R&D and industry output for both standards. The same conclusion applies to the social welfare comparison for the emissions standard. However, for the performance standard, the same conclusion requires a damage parameter below a given threshhold. When the standards are chosen to maximize welfare, the performance comparison becomes highly parameter-dependent, except that social welfare is higher for the performance standard. Some policy implications are discussed.
A One-Stage Model of Abatement Innovation in Cournot Duopoly: Emissions vs Performance Standards
This paper evaluates the comparative performance of emission and performance standards in a one-stage game of abatement R&D and Cournot duopoly, in terms of R&D propensity, output and social welfare. For each standard, firms simultaneously select R&D and output levels, given the standard’s exogenous constraint. A performance standard generates higher R&D investments and output, but lower profit, than the pollution-equivalent emissions standard. The same conclusion extends to social welfare only under high demand. We also conduct a similar comparison for each of the two instruments across the one-stage and the two-stage models. The two-stage model leads to higher levels of R&D and industry output for both standards. The same conclusion applies to the social welfare comparison for the emissions standard. However, for the performance standard, the same conclusion requires a damage parameter below a given threshhold. When the standards are chosen to maximize welfare, the performance comparison becomes highly parameter-dependent, except that social welfare is higher for the performance standard. Some policy implications are discussed.
A One-Stage Model of Abatement Innovation in Cournot Duopoly: Emissions vs Performance Standards
Environ Model Assess
Amir, Rabah (Autor:in) / Gama, Adriana (Autor:in) / Lahmandi-Ayed, Rim (Autor:in) / Werner, Katarzyna (Autor:in)
Environmental Modeling & Assessment ; 28 ; 875-891
01.10.2023
17 pages
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Environmental regulation , Environmental innovation , End of pipe abatement , Emission standard , Performance standard Q55 , Q57 , L13 , Environment , Math. Appl. in Environmental Science , Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics , Operations Research/Decision Theory , Applications of Mathematics , Earth and Environmental Science
| Online Contents | 1998
| Online Contents | 2009
| Online Contents | 2009
| Online Contents | 2006
| DOAJ | 2023