Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Killing rattlesnakes before they bite you!
On Saturday, April 29, 2006 at 7:28 a.m., there was a sudden release of hydrocarbons followed by a 'blow torch like' fire in the ethylene recovery area of the Huntsman PABC (Port Arthur Base Chemicals) LOU (light olefins unit). There were no fatalities or serious injuries from the fire, and one case of heat exhaustion associated with fighting the fire. Two team behaviours and an event of good luck reduced the potential of injury. The LOU operations team strictly denied work permits and access during the upset condition in which the ethylene recovery area was before the fire. And the Huntsman Emergency Rsponse and Sabine Area Mutual Aid teams quickly responded to the fire. The released fuel, 46 % ethylene with methane, propylene, ethane, propane, hydrogen, and others, quickly ignited to a fire, and therefore not to an explosion. Here, the events and causal factors are reported, including specific recommendations to reduce the risk of repeat event. One of the main causal factors was heavy corrosion in a two-foot area of the qarm-up line caused by condensed water dripping from cold service uninsulated lines, with rupture due to a resulting wall thickness of 0.018 inches compared to the original thickness of 0.332 inches and the minimum requirement for normal operating pressure of 0.045 inches. Abnormal cracked gas pressure spikes were caused by an ice/hydrate plug formed in the second cold train cold box. Potential ignition sources were an exposed superheated steam piping, a superheated steam leak, and a possible spark caused by a line section ripped loose. Other factors leading to the incident were failure of the existing MI (mechanical integrity) system and inspection processes, cracked gas compressor pressure and surge control system design and operation, and cold train plugging mechanisms and training to remove plugging. Especially details of corrosion under insulation and ice/hydrate plugging are discussed in detail, including dew point moisture effects. Recommendations include more aggressive inspection programs for insulated piping, ensuring inspection completion and reports, reviewing piping geometry to exclude 'drippers', investigation of anti-surge controls for refrigerated lines, improving moisture measurements, and training for operatios, maintenance and technical personnel.
Killing rattlesnakes before they bite you!
On Saturday, April 29, 2006 at 7:28 a.m., there was a sudden release of hydrocarbons followed by a 'blow torch like' fire in the ethylene recovery area of the Huntsman PABC (Port Arthur Base Chemicals) LOU (light olefins unit). There were no fatalities or serious injuries from the fire, and one case of heat exhaustion associated with fighting the fire. Two team behaviours and an event of good luck reduced the potential of injury. The LOU operations team strictly denied work permits and access during the upset condition in which the ethylene recovery area was before the fire. And the Huntsman Emergency Rsponse and Sabine Area Mutual Aid teams quickly responded to the fire. The released fuel, 46 % ethylene with methane, propylene, ethane, propane, hydrogen, and others, quickly ignited to a fire, and therefore not to an explosion. Here, the events and causal factors are reported, including specific recommendations to reduce the risk of repeat event. One of the main causal factors was heavy corrosion in a two-foot area of the qarm-up line caused by condensed water dripping from cold service uninsulated lines, with rupture due to a resulting wall thickness of 0.018 inches compared to the original thickness of 0.332 inches and the minimum requirement for normal operating pressure of 0.045 inches. Abnormal cracked gas pressure spikes were caused by an ice/hydrate plug formed in the second cold train cold box. Potential ignition sources were an exposed superheated steam piping, a superheated steam leak, and a possible spark caused by a line section ripped loose. Other factors leading to the incident were failure of the existing MI (mechanical integrity) system and inspection processes, cracked gas compressor pressure and surge control system design and operation, and cold train plugging mechanisms and training to remove plugging. Especially details of corrosion under insulation and ice/hydrate plugging are discussed in detail, including dew point moisture effects. Recommendations include more aggressive inspection programs for insulated piping, ensuring inspection completion and reports, reviewing piping geometry to exclude 'drippers', investigation of anti-surge controls for refrigerated lines, improving moisture measurements, and training for operatios, maintenance and technical personnel.
Killing rattlesnakes before they bite you!
Prows, John B. (Autor:in)
2009
26 Seiten, 13 Bilder, 1 Tabelle
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Datenträger
Englisch
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