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Finding Multiple Equilibria for Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky and Nash Bargaining Equilibria in Electricity Markets: A Bilateral Contract Model
In a deregulated market, energy can be exchanged like a commodity and the market agents including generators, distributors, and the end consumers can trade energy independently settling the price, volume, and the supply terms. Bilateral contracts (BCs) have been applied to hedge against price volatility in the electricity spot market. This work introduces a model to find all solutions for the equilibria implementing the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinski (RKS) and the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) approaches in an electricity market based on BCs. It is based on creating “holes” around an existing equilibrium within the feasibility set, yielding a new (smaller) feasibility set at each iteration. This research has two players: a generation company (GC) and an electricity supplier company (ESC), aiming to achieve the highest profit for each of them. The results present all possible RKS and NBS, in addition to showing all assigned energies for a case study at different time frames. The multiple equilibria solutions allow the ESC and the GC to apply different strategies knowing that they can still achieve an optimal solution.
Finding Multiple Equilibria for Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky and Nash Bargaining Equilibria in Electricity Markets: A Bilateral Contract Model
In a deregulated market, energy can be exchanged like a commodity and the market agents including generators, distributors, and the end consumers can trade energy independently settling the price, volume, and the supply terms. Bilateral contracts (BCs) have been applied to hedge against price volatility in the electricity spot market. This work introduces a model to find all solutions for the equilibria implementing the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinski (RKS) and the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) approaches in an electricity market based on BCs. It is based on creating “holes” around an existing equilibrium within the feasibility set, yielding a new (smaller) feasibility set at each iteration. This research has two players: a generation company (GC) and an electricity supplier company (ESC), aiming to achieve the highest profit for each of them. The results present all possible RKS and NBS, in addition to showing all assigned energies for a case study at different time frames. The multiple equilibria solutions allow the ESC and the GC to apply different strategies knowing that they can still achieve an optimal solution.
Finding Multiple Equilibria for Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky and Nash Bargaining Equilibria in Electricity Markets: A Bilateral Contract Model
Reinaldo C. Garcia (author) / Javier Contreras (author) / Bárbara Caldeira Macedo (author) / Daniel da Silva Monteiro (author) / Matheus L. Barbosa (author)
2021
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
Unknown
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