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A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety
The violation behavior of construction workers is an important cause of construction accidents. To reduce the violations of construction workers and to stimulate the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed in this paper. Then, the behavior choice mechanism of each player is analyzed. Finally, an incentive effect analysis method is put forward, and the incentive effects of different tax incentive mechanisms are analyzed. This research finds that only when the safety punishment imposed on construction workers is large enough does the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises encourage construction workers to choose not to violate the regulation. Increasing the tax rate of a construction enterprise in the case of accidents can encourage the construction enterprise to supervise, but it inhibits the supervision behavior of the local government. A numerical simulation verifies the effectiveness of the incentive effect analysis method, which provides a new method for the incentive effect analysis of incentive mechanisms.
Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety
The violation behavior of construction workers is an important cause of construction accidents. To reduce the violations of construction workers and to stimulate the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed in this paper. Then, the behavior choice mechanism of each player is analyzed. Finally, an incentive effect analysis method is put forward, and the incentive effects of different tax incentive mechanisms are analyzed. This research finds that only when the safety punishment imposed on construction workers is large enough does the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises encourage construction workers to choose not to violate the regulation. Increasing the tax rate of a construction enterprise in the case of accidents can encourage the construction enterprise to supervise, but it inhibits the supervision behavior of the local government. A numerical simulation verifies the effectiveness of the incentive effect analysis method, which provides a new method for the incentive effect analysis of incentive mechanisms.
Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety
Jun Liu (author) / Xinhua Wang (author) / Tao Liu (author)
2022
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
Unknown
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