A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference
Given consumers’ willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV’s supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers’ low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers’ low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex-factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision-making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers’ profits under decentralized decision-making are greater than the dealers’ profits, and the sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision-making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision-making. We design a revenue-sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.
Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference
Given consumers’ willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV’s supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers’ low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers’ low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex-factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision-making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers’ profits under decentralized decision-making are greater than the dealers’ profits, and the sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision-making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision-making. We design a revenue-sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.
Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference
Bengang Gong (author) / Xuan Xia (author) / Jinshi Cheng (author)
2020
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
Unknown
Metadata by DOAJ is licensed under CC BY-SA 1.0
The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference
| DOAJ | 2020
Pricing and Coordination Strategies of Dual Channels Considering Consumers’ Channel Preferences
| DOAJ | 2021