Developing a Bankruptcy Theory to Resolve Stakeholders’ Conflict over Optimal Water Allocation: The Case of Hirmand Catchment: Fid-Bau Portal

Developing a Bankruptcy Theory to Resolve Stakeholders’ Conflict over Optimal Water Allocation: The Case of Hirmand Catchment

Ali Sardar Shahraki / Vijay P. Singh / Ommolbanin Bazrafshan

Abstract

The growing increase in demand for water and the lack of balance between water supply and demand have led to conflicts among the downstream stakeholders of the international Hirmand River. This river is shared between Iran and Afghanistan and is located in the southeast of Iran, in the Sistan region. The Vardkhaneh is divided into two branches, Parian and Sistan, and it is the only main source of water in the Sistan region of Iran. The inner part of Hirmand catchment is considered bankrupt concerning its water resources, so there is a need to take the current status and resulting issues into account in order to resolve conflicts. In Hirmand catchment, four different games of bankruptcy theory, namely proportional (Pr), adjusted proportional (AP), constrained equal award (CEA), and constrained equal losses (CEL), were developed as optimization models based on genetic algorithms. For this purpose, the catchment was simulated with 26 scenarios using the WEAP 2022 version software for an average time period. The results of the bankruptcy game modeling showed that water could be effectively allocated to resolve conflicts among stakeholders. It is therefore recommended to use such a model to resolve fights and optimally allocate resources, even in bankrupt catchments.