A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Travel mental budgeting under road toll: An investigation based on user equilibrium
Highlights The conceptions of mental budgeting are introduced into travelers’ route choice. Travelers set mental accounts to keep out-of-pocket travel cost under control. The simple and general networks are modeled and analyzed. The main reason that the usages of tolled roads are often overestimated is found.
Abstract With the approach of introducing the conceptions of mental account and mental budgeting into the process of travelers’ route choice, we try to identify why the usages of tolled roads are often overestimated. Assuming that every traveler sets a mental account for his/her travel to keep track of their expense and keep out-of-pocket spending under control, it addresses these questions such that “How much money can I spend on the travel?” and “What if I spend too much?”. Route tolls that exceed the budget are much more unacceptable compared to those within budget due to the non-fungibility of money between different accounts. A simple network with two nodes and two routes is analyzed firstly, the analytical solutions are obtained and the optimal road tolls supporting the user equilibrium as a system optimum are also derived. The proposed model is then extended to a generalized network. The multiclass user equilibrium conditions with travel mental budgeting are formulated into an equivalent variational inequality (VI) problem and an equivalent minimization problem. Through analyses with numerical examples, it is found that the main reason that the usages of high tolled roads are often overestimated is due to the fact that travelers with low and moderate out-of-pocket travel budget perceive a much higher travel cost than their actual cost on the high tolled roads.
Travel mental budgeting under road toll: An investigation based on user equilibrium
Highlights The conceptions of mental budgeting are introduced into travelers’ route choice. Travelers set mental accounts to keep out-of-pocket travel cost under control. The simple and general networks are modeled and analyzed. The main reason that the usages of tolled roads are often overestimated is found.
Abstract With the approach of introducing the conceptions of mental account and mental budgeting into the process of travelers’ route choice, we try to identify why the usages of tolled roads are often overestimated. Assuming that every traveler sets a mental account for his/her travel to keep track of their expense and keep out-of-pocket spending under control, it addresses these questions such that “How much money can I spend on the travel?” and “What if I spend too much?”. Route tolls that exceed the budget are much more unacceptable compared to those within budget due to the non-fungibility of money between different accounts. A simple network with two nodes and two routes is analyzed firstly, the analytical solutions are obtained and the optimal road tolls supporting the user equilibrium as a system optimum are also derived. The proposed model is then extended to a generalized network. The multiclass user equilibrium conditions with travel mental budgeting are formulated into an equivalent variational inequality (VI) problem and an equivalent minimization problem. Through analyses with numerical examples, it is found that the main reason that the usages of high tolled roads are often overestimated is due to the fact that travelers with low and moderate out-of-pocket travel budget perceive a much higher travel cost than their actual cost on the high tolled roads.
Travel mental budgeting under road toll: An investigation based on user equilibrium
Bao, Yue (author) / Gao, Ziyou (author) / Xu, Meng (author) / Sun, Huijun (author) / Yang, Hai (author)
2014-12-22
17 pages
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
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