A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Precontractual investigation and risk aversion
This paper presents an analytical framework for determining efficient levels and durations of precontractual investigation. Economic efficiency in the allocation of investigation tasks between client and tenderer is shown to depend on how closely related the technologies of investigation and construction are. Moreover, risk aversion and the interest rate affect the efficient allocation. The framework is also used as a basis for an investment analysis of the balance between client's investigation efforts and expected claims in the future. Finally, the framework is used to show how the optimal length of the investigation period can be derived from the expected cash flow associated with a project over its total life cycle, from inception to demolition. Results indicate the economic potential of tailoring risk sharing in construction procurement, according to the type of construction project and the attitudes to risk among client and contractors.
Precontractual investigation and risk aversion
This paper presents an analytical framework for determining efficient levels and durations of precontractual investigation. Economic efficiency in the allocation of investigation tasks between client and tenderer is shown to depend on how closely related the technologies of investigation and construction are. Moreover, risk aversion and the interest rate affect the efficient allocation. The framework is also used as a basis for an investment analysis of the balance between client's investigation efforts and expected claims in the future. Finally, the framework is used to show how the optimal length of the investigation period can be derived from the expected cash flow associated with a project over its total life cycle, from inception to demolition. Results indicate the economic potential of tailoring risk sharing in construction procurement, according to the type of construction project and the attitudes to risk among client and contractors.
Precontractual investigation and risk aversion
BRÖCHNER, JAN (author)
1994-02-01
11 pages
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
Risk aversion, regret aversion and travel choice inertia: an experimental study
Taylor & Francis Verlag | 2014
|Risk aversion, regret aversion and travel choice inertia: an experimental study
Online Contents | 2014
|Production location choice and risk aversion
Online Contents | 2001
|Bidding Models: Effects of Bidders’ Risk Aversion
ASCE | 2021
|Unemployment benefits, risk aversion, and migration incentives
Online Contents | 2005
|