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Mortar Utilization at the Army's Combat Training Centers
This study was requested by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), whose data collection process at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) indicated that mortar platoons in both light and heavy battalions, in the United States and Europe, were not making an effective contribution to battle outcomes. Whereas their data contained anecdotal points and summary statements of mortar problems, CALL wished for a more systematic investigation of the mortar problem so it could recommend remedial actions. The objectives of this work were to answer four questions: Is it true that mortars are underutilized at the CTCs; Are CTC results a proper measure of mortar performance; If the first two answers are 'yes', can the causes of underutilization be identified; and Can fixes be identified in doctrine, training, organization, leadership, or equipment to improve mortar performance. Take Home Packages (THP) and field observations prepared by three CTCs were reviewed to assist in evaluating mortar training. These data suggested that light, medium, and heavy mortar weapons were underutilized or ineffective at all three CTCs studied: The National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). The authors also reviewed the methods employed at each CTC to replicate indirect fire and its effects. Battle Damage Assessment was performed by fire markers or by observer/controllers according to fire effects tables. These data confirmed that mortars caused little damage and mortar ammunition expenditure fell far below that expected. Mortars are underutilized at the CTCs because of perceived limited effects of suppression and, for heavy mortar training, limited dismounted infantry activity at NTC and CMTC. The authors conclude that staff planning failure is the prime cause of mortar underutilization. The responsibility for this problem is shared between the maneuver and fire support staffs.
Mortar Utilization at the Army's Combat Training Centers
This study was requested by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), whose data collection process at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) indicated that mortar platoons in both light and heavy battalions, in the United States and Europe, were not making an effective contribution to battle outcomes. Whereas their data contained anecdotal points and summary statements of mortar problems, CALL wished for a more systematic investigation of the mortar problem so it could recommend remedial actions. The objectives of this work were to answer four questions: Is it true that mortars are underutilized at the CTCs; Are CTC results a proper measure of mortar performance; If the first two answers are 'yes', can the causes of underutilization be identified; and Can fixes be identified in doctrine, training, organization, leadership, or equipment to improve mortar performance. Take Home Packages (THP) and field observations prepared by three CTCs were reviewed to assist in evaluating mortar training. These data suggested that light, medium, and heavy mortar weapons were underutilized or ineffective at all three CTCs studied: The National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). The authors also reviewed the methods employed at each CTC to replicate indirect fire and its effects. Battle Damage Assessment was performed by fire markers or by observer/controllers according to fire effects tables. These data confirmed that mortars caused little damage and mortar ammunition expenditure fell far below that expected. Mortars are underutilized at the CTCs because of perceived limited effects of suppression and, for heavy mortar training, limited dismounted infantry activity at NTC and CMTC. The authors conclude that staff planning failure is the prime cause of mortar underutilization. The responsibility for this problem is shared between the maneuver and fire support staffs.
Mortar Utilization at the Army's Combat Training Centers
S. J. Kirin (author) / M. Goldsmith (author)
1992
151 pages
Report
No indication
English
Management Practice , Military Sciences , Ammunition, Explosives, & Pyrotechnics , Guns , Combat effectiveness , Army training , Fire support , Utilization , Training management , Mortars , Observers , Lessons learned , Leadership , Military doctrine , Performance(Human) , Infantry , Damage assessment , Army facilities , Mortar ammunition , Consumption , Maneuvers , Battles , Fire suppression , Platoon level organizations , Indirect fire , Mortar performance , Ammunition consumption , Casualty assessment , Firing data
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