A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
The stability of a collusive spatial oligopoly
Abstract This paper examines the stability of a free entry spatial equilibrium when firms set collusive Loschian prices. Drawing on developments in game theory it is shown that (Loschian) collusive pricing is feasible and sustainable only if firms earn excess profits. The final section of the paper briefly examines some of the comparative static properties of the model.
The stability of a collusive spatial oligopoly
Abstract This paper examines the stability of a free entry spatial equilibrium when firms set collusive Loschian prices. Drawing on developments in game theory it is shown that (Loschian) collusive pricing is feasible and sustainable only if firms earn excess profits. The final section of the paper briefly examines some of the comparative static properties of the model.
The stability of a collusive spatial oligopoly
Damania, D. (author)
1993
Article (Journal)
English
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