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Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation

Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco

Abstract This article reinterprets, under a common framework, previous results on location choice under delivered pricing. The paper clearly identifies the economic forces which explain why the socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game in some models, and why they are not an equilibrium in other models. The paper shows that the rationale behind Hamilton et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 19:87–102, 1989) and Gupta’s (Reg Sci Urban Econ 24:265–272, 1994) non-optimality results are very different. While the first result is explained by the social inefficiency of the price game, the second one is due to the existence of a strategic effect.

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Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation

Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco

Abstract This article reinterprets, under a common framework, previous results on location choice under delivered pricing. The paper clearly identifies the economic forces which explain why the socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game in some models, and why they are not an equilibrium in other models. The paper shows that the rationale behind Hamilton et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 19:87–102, 1989) and Gupta’s (Reg Sci Urban Econ 24:265–272, 1994) non-optimality results are very different. While the first result is explained by the social inefficiency of the price game, the second one is due to the existence of a strategic effect.

Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation

Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco

Abstract This article reinterprets, under a common framework, previous results on location choice under delivered pricing. The paper clearly identifies the economic forces which explain why the socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game in some models, and why they are not an equilibrium in other models. The paper shows that the rationale behind Hamilton et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 19:87–102, 1989) and Gupta’s (Reg Sci Urban Econ 24:265–272, 1994) non-optimality results are very different. While the first result is explained by the social inefficiency of the price game, the second one is due to the existence of a strategic effect.

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Title:

Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation

Contributors:

Pires, Cesaltina Pacheco (author)

Published in:

The Annals of Regional Science ; 43

Publication date:

2008

ISSN:

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-008-0212-4

Type of media:

Article (Journal)

Type of material:

Print

Language:

English

Keywords:

Regionalökonomik , Zeitschrift , Kommunalpolitik , Stadtentwicklung , Umweltforschung , Regionalforschung , Raumordnung , Umweltwissenschaften , Regionalwissenschaft , Regionalentwicklung , Städtebau

Classification:

BKL: 74.72 Stadtplanung, kommunale Planung / 83.64 Regionalwirtschaft / 74.12 Stadtgeographie, Siedlungsgeographie
Local classification TIB: 770/3010

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