A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Spatial Cournot competition in two intersecting circular markets
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8236-1904
Abstract This paper analyzes the location equilibrium in two intersecting circular markets where two identical firms engage in Cournot competition. It is shown that each of the two intersection points occupied by one of the firms is the unique fully symmetric location equilibrium and also the social optimum, which is neither maximal nor minimal differentiation. The intuition of our result is that by each firm locating at each of the intersection points, firms can minimize their transport costs and partially avoid competition, compared with both locating at one of the intersection points. Our finding coincides with the real-world phenomenon that transport hubs may attract the presence of more firms.
Spatial Cournot competition in two intersecting circular markets
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8236-1904
Abstract This paper analyzes the location equilibrium in two intersecting circular markets where two identical firms engage in Cournot competition. It is shown that each of the two intersection points occupied by one of the firms is the unique fully symmetric location equilibrium and also the social optimum, which is neither maximal nor minimal differentiation. The intuition of our result is that by each firm locating at each of the intersection points, firms can minimize their transport costs and partially avoid competition, compared with both locating at one of the intersection points. Our finding coincides with the real-world phenomenon that transport hubs may attract the presence of more firms.
Spatial Cournot competition in two intersecting circular markets
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8236-1904
Abstract This paper analyzes the location equilibrium in two intersecting circular markets where two identical firms engage in Cournot competition. It is shown that each of the two intersection points occupied by one of the firms is the unique fully symmetric location equilibrium and also the social optimum, which is neither maximal nor minimal differentiation. The intuition of our result is that by each firm locating at each of the intersection points, firms can minimize their transport costs and partially avoid competition, compared with both locating at one of the intersection points. Our finding coincides with the real-world phenomenon that transport hubs may attract the presence of more firms.
Spatial Cournot competition in two intersecting circular markets
Guo, Wen-Chung (author) / Lai, Fu-Chuan (author)
2019
Article (Journal)
English
Spatial Cournot competition in two intersecting circular markets
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