A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Network facility-location models in Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot spatial competition
Abstract A hierarchical mathematical programming approach is combined with sensitivity analysis (of variational inequalities) to formulate a facility-location model for a firm competing on a discrete network. It is assumed that the locating firm will act as the leader firm in an industry characterized by Stackelberg leader-follower(s) oligopolistic competition. The othern competitors in this industry are assumed to act as Cournot firms that each operate under the Cournot assumption of zero conjectural variation with respect to theirn — 1 Cournot competitors. It is further assumed that then Cournot firms will react to the location/production/shipping activities of the Stackelberg firm. Therefore, when the Stackelberg firm makes its location, production, and shipping decisions it takes into account the reaction of then Cournot firms to its (the Stackelberg firm's) integrated location and distribution decisions. Specifically, a Cournot reaction function is developed and imbedded in the Stackelberg firm's profit-maximizing objective function to project the anticipated reaction of the Cournot firms to the Stackelberg firm's location decision.
Network facility-location models in Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot spatial competition
Abstract A hierarchical mathematical programming approach is combined with sensitivity analysis (of variational inequalities) to formulate a facility-location model for a firm competing on a discrete network. It is assumed that the locating firm will act as the leader firm in an industry characterized by Stackelberg leader-follower(s) oligopolistic competition. The othern competitors in this industry are assumed to act as Cournot firms that each operate under the Cournot assumption of zero conjectural variation with respect to theirn — 1 Cournot competitors. It is further assumed that then Cournot firms will react to the location/production/shipping activities of the Stackelberg firm. Therefore, when the Stackelberg firm makes its location, production, and shipping decisions it takes into account the reaction of then Cournot firms to its (the Stackelberg firm's) integrated location and distribution decisions. Specifically, a Cournot reaction function is developed and imbedded in the Stackelberg firm's profit-maximizing objective function to project the anticipated reaction of the Cournot firms to the Stackelberg firm's location decision.
Network facility-location models in Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot spatial competition
Miller, Tan (author) / Tobin, Roger L. (author) / Friesz, Terry L. (author)
1992
Article (Journal)
English
BKL:
74.12
Stadtgeographie, Siedlungsgeographie
Cournot oligopolistic competition in spatially separated markets: The Stackelberg equilibrium
Online Contents | 2004
|Spatial Cournot competition and agglomeration in a model of location choice
Online Contents | 1997
|Dispersion equilibria in spatial Cournot competition
Online Contents | 2014
|Dispersion equilibria in spatial Cournot competition
Online Contents | 2014
|Trade infrastructure and firm location under Cournot competition
Online Contents | 2011
|