A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms
Abstract. The nature of the equilibria arising under spatial differentiation is investigated here in a duopoly model, where at least one firm maximises value added per worker. The study shows that if firms' objectives differ, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, which is possibly characterised by asymmetric locations. If both firms are labour-managed, there exists a (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first and third quartiles, if and only if the setup cost is low enough. Otherwise, undercutting is profitable.
Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms
Abstract. The nature of the equilibria arising under spatial differentiation is investigated here in a duopoly model, where at least one firm maximises value added per worker. The study shows that if firms' objectives differ, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, which is possibly characterised by asymmetric locations. If both firms are labour-managed, there exists a (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first and third quartiles, if and only if the setup cost is low enough. Otherwise, undercutting is profitable.
Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms
Lambertini, Luca (author)
2001
Article (Journal)
English
BKL:
74.12
Stadtgeographie, Siedlungsgeographie
Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms
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