A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Occupational risks, social insurance and investments in education
Abstract. A link between social insurance and education policy is explored. Due to moral hazard full insurance against disability is not feasible. When high- and low-risk individuals can be identified second-best social insurance system entails cross-subsidies from the low-risk group to the high-risk group. Implementation of this second-best insurance however distorts the human capital investment decisions when education qualifies for a low risk job. Therefore, the second-best social insurance together with an education subsidy is a welfare improving policy. An education policy also has the role of establishing dynamic consistency of the government's policy.
Occupational risks, social insurance and investments in education
Abstract. A link between social insurance and education policy is explored. Due to moral hazard full insurance against disability is not feasible. When high- and low-risk individuals can be identified second-best social insurance system entails cross-subsidies from the low-risk group to the high-risk group. Implementation of this second-best insurance however distorts the human capital investment decisions when education qualifies for a low risk job. Therefore, the second-best social insurance together with an education subsidy is a welfare improving policy. An education policy also has the role of establishing dynamic consistency of the government's policy.
Occupational risks, social insurance and investments in education
Anderberg, Dan (author)
2000
Article (Journal)
English
Market insurance, social insurance, and education
Online Contents | 1995
|British Library Conference Proceedings | 1998
|OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS SCHEME OF SOCIAL INSURANCE IN SAUDI ARABIA: OVERVIEW
Online Contents | 1996
|Online Contents | 1996
An Insurance Decision Model for Contractor's All Risks Insurance
British Library Conference Proceedings | 2005
|