A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Do urban redevelopment incentives promote asset deterioration? A game-theoretic approach
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0530-5172
Abstract The elapsed time between a government’s announcement of its intention to redevelop and the launch of the new construction may often be quite lengthy. This study uses a game-theoretic framework to examine the effect of the option to redevelop on the quality of the existing housing stock during this extended pre-redevelopment period. We show that the benefits that accompany future redevelopment may lead to accelerated deterioration in the pre-redevelopment period. Moreover, we identify circumstances under which there exists a unique perfect Nash equilibrium where, in order to discourage objections by other homeowners, those who support redevelopment intentionally promote structural deterioration during the pre-redevelopment period. Our results highlight the need to shorten the period of time between the announcement of the option to redevelop and its implementation.
Do urban redevelopment incentives promote asset deterioration? A game-theoretic approach
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0530-5172
Abstract The elapsed time between a government’s announcement of its intention to redevelop and the launch of the new construction may often be quite lengthy. This study uses a game-theoretic framework to examine the effect of the option to redevelop on the quality of the existing housing stock during this extended pre-redevelopment period. We show that the benefits that accompany future redevelopment may lead to accelerated deterioration in the pre-redevelopment period. Moreover, we identify circumstances under which there exists a unique perfect Nash equilibrium where, in order to discourage objections by other homeowners, those who support redevelopment intentionally promote structural deterioration during the pre-redevelopment period. Our results highlight the need to shorten the period of time between the announcement of the option to redevelop and its implementation.
Do urban redevelopment incentives promote asset deterioration? A game-theoretic approach
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0530-5172
Abstract The elapsed time between a government’s announcement of its intention to redevelop and the launch of the new construction may often be quite lengthy. This study uses a game-theoretic framework to examine the effect of the option to redevelop on the quality of the existing housing stock during this extended pre-redevelopment period. We show that the benefits that accompany future redevelopment may lead to accelerated deterioration in the pre-redevelopment period. Moreover, we identify circumstances under which there exists a unique perfect Nash equilibrium where, in order to discourage objections by other homeowners, those who support redevelopment intentionally promote structural deterioration during the pre-redevelopment period. Our results highlight the need to shorten the period of time between the announcement of the option to redevelop and its implementation.
Do urban redevelopment incentives promote asset deterioration? A game-theoretic approach
Golan, Roni (author)
2019
Article (Journal)
English
BKL:
56.00$jBauwesen: Allgemeines
/
56.81$jWohnungsbau$XArchitektur
/
74.72
Stadtplanung, kommunale Planung
/
74.72$jStadtplanung$jkommunale Planung
/
56.00
Bauwesen: Allgemeines
/
74.60$jRaumordnung$jStädtebau: Allgemeines
/
74.60
Raumordnung, Städtebau: Allgemeines
/
56.81
Wohnungsbau
Do urban redevelopment incentives promote asset deterioration? A game-theoretic approach
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