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Symmetric Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4181-2323
Abstract In this paper, we study the impacts and effects of the number of countries and green technology on climate agreements. In a repeated climate game framework, we focus on the symmetric and self-enforcing weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. The set of every country’s feasible abatements is bounded and independent of the number of signatory countries. We derive the maximal number of signatory countries that can reach a fully cooperative (most efficient) climate agreement. We also analyze the maximal equilibrium abatement level when there are too many countries to sustain the fully cooperative agreement. The maximal equilibrium abatement level changes non-monotonically in the number of the countries; it first increases and then decreases in the number of countries involved. Our findings demonstrate a trade-off between the breadth and the depth for international climate agreements.
Symmetric Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4181-2323
Abstract In this paper, we study the impacts and effects of the number of countries and green technology on climate agreements. In a repeated climate game framework, we focus on the symmetric and self-enforcing weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. The set of every country’s feasible abatements is bounded and independent of the number of signatory countries. We derive the maximal number of signatory countries that can reach a fully cooperative (most efficient) climate agreement. We also analyze the maximal equilibrium abatement level when there are too many countries to sustain the fully cooperative agreement. The maximal equilibrium abatement level changes non-monotonically in the number of the countries; it first increases and then decreases in the number of countries involved. Our findings demonstrate a trade-off between the breadth and the depth for international climate agreements.
Symmetric Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4181-2323
Abstract In this paper, we study the impacts and effects of the number of countries and green technology on climate agreements. In a repeated climate game framework, we focus on the symmetric and self-enforcing weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. The set of every country’s feasible abatements is bounded and independent of the number of signatory countries. We derive the maximal number of signatory countries that can reach a fully cooperative (most efficient) climate agreement. We also analyze the maximal equilibrium abatement level when there are too many countries to sustain the fully cooperative agreement. The maximal equilibrium abatement level changes non-monotonically in the number of the countries; it first increases and then decreases in the number of countries involved. Our findings demonstrate a trade-off between the breadth and the depth for international climate agreements.
Symmetric Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements
Aramendia, Miguel (author) / Wen, Quan (author)
2021
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
BKL:
43.00
Umweltforschung, Umweltschutz: Allgemeines
/
43.00$jUmweltforschung$jUmweltschutz: Allgemeines
Symmetric Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements
| Springer Verlag | 2021
Wiley | 1944
Renegotiation of war contracts
| Engineering Index Backfile | 1943