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Interweaving Incentives and Disincentives for Construction Dispute Negotiation Settlement
What incentives and disincentives motivate negotiators to settle or not in a construction dispute negotiation (CDN)? A thorough literature review is conducted on this subject to identify the antecedents of negotiators’ intention to settle (ITS) in CDN. Three relevant constructs are identified: motivation (i.e., prosocial and proself motive), cognition (i.e., justice and power), and psychological bonding (i.e., trust and shared vision). Categorically, this study finds that in the negotiation context, negotiators having a prosocial motive and perceiving justice about the negotiation process and outcome can stimulate negotiators’ ITS, which can be seen as incentives; however, the proself motive and perceived power advantage would serve the opposite, thus can be classified as disincentives. In addition, cumulated trust and shared vision during the project collaboration can also play an incentive role in promoting negotiators’ intention. As a result, this study develops a link between the incentive/disincentive (I/D) and negotiators’ intention to settle through the literature review. A better understanding of these agents of I/D can help explain negotiation conditions and negotiators’ decisions whereby appropriate negotiation strategies can be devised.
Interweaving Incentives and Disincentives for Construction Dispute Negotiation Settlement
What incentives and disincentives motivate negotiators to settle or not in a construction dispute negotiation (CDN)? A thorough literature review is conducted on this subject to identify the antecedents of negotiators’ intention to settle (ITS) in CDN. Three relevant constructs are identified: motivation (i.e., prosocial and proself motive), cognition (i.e., justice and power), and psychological bonding (i.e., trust and shared vision). Categorically, this study finds that in the negotiation context, negotiators having a prosocial motive and perceiving justice about the negotiation process and outcome can stimulate negotiators’ ITS, which can be seen as incentives; however, the proself motive and perceived power advantage would serve the opposite, thus can be classified as disincentives. In addition, cumulated trust and shared vision during the project collaboration can also play an incentive role in promoting negotiators’ intention. As a result, this study develops a link between the incentive/disincentive (I/D) and negotiators’ intention to settle through the literature review. A better understanding of these agents of I/D can help explain negotiation conditions and negotiators’ decisions whereby appropriate negotiation strategies can be devised.
Interweaving Incentives and Disincentives for Construction Dispute Negotiation Settlement
Digital Innovations in
Cheung, Sai On (editor) / Zhu, Liuying (editor) / Lin, Sen (author)
2023-05-24
29 pages
Article/Chapter (Book)
Electronic Resource
English
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