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Pareto-Improving Supply Subsidy in a Simple General Oligopoly Equilibrium Model with Pollution Permits
https://orcid.org/http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5521-7926
We introduce a competitive pollution permit market in a two-sector oligopoly equilibrium model. In this model, one commodity is inelastically supplied by one competitive trader and another one is produced by a finite set of oligopolists, using the first commodity as an input. The production of the second commodity is a polluting activity. We study both the competitive and oligopoly equilibria. We provide some conditions under which a supply subsidy given to the oligopolists that is financed by a tax on the competitive agent is Pareto-improving.
Pareto-Improving Supply Subsidy in a Simple General Oligopoly Equilibrium Model with Pollution Permits
https://orcid.org/http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5521-7926
We introduce a competitive pollution permit market in a two-sector oligopoly equilibrium model. In this model, one commodity is inelastically supplied by one competitive trader and another one is produced by a finite set of oligopolists, using the first commodity as an input. The production of the second commodity is a polluting activity. We study both the competitive and oligopoly equilibria. We provide some conditions under which a supply subsidy given to the oligopolists that is financed by a tax on the competitive agent is Pareto-improving.
Pareto-Improving Supply Subsidy in a Simple General Oligopoly Equilibrium Model with Pollution Permits
https://orcid.org/http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5521-7926
We introduce a competitive pollution permit market in a two-sector oligopoly equilibrium model. In this model, one commodity is inelastically supplied by one competitive trader and another one is produced by a finite set of oligopolists, using the first commodity as an input. The production of the second commodity is a polluting activity. We study both the competitive and oligopoly equilibria. We provide some conditions under which a supply subsidy given to the oligopolists that is financed by a tax on the competitive agent is Pareto-improving.
Pareto-Improving Supply Subsidy in a Simple General Oligopoly Equilibrium Model with Pollution Permits
Environ Model Assess
Crettez, Bertrand (author) / Jouvet, Pierre-Andre (author) / Julien, Ludovic A. (author)
Environmental Modeling & Assessment ; 26 ; 999-1013
2021-12-01
15 pages
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
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