Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Eine Plattform für die Wissenschaft: Bauingenieurwesen, Architektur und Urbanistik
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers
Abstract If an altruist is expected to aid a person with low utility, that person may be induced to save little. Such behavior generates a good Samaritan dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduce the effect and can lead to an outcome which is Pareto-superior to the outcome under a Nash equilibrium with no government taxation and transfers.
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers
Abstract If an altruist is expected to aid a person with low utility, that person may be induced to save little. Such behavior generates a good Samaritan dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduce the effect and can lead to an outcome which is Pareto-superior to the outcome under a Nash equilibrium with no government taxation and transfers.
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers
Glazer, Amihai (Autor:in) / Kondo, Hiroki (Autor:in)
2014
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Englisch
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