A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers
Abstract If an altruist is expected to aid a person with low utility, that person may be induced to save little. Such behavior generates a good Samaritan dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduce the effect and can lead to an outcome which is Pareto-superior to the outcome under a Nash equilibrium with no government taxation and transfers.
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers
Abstract If an altruist is expected to aid a person with low utility, that person may be induced to save little. Such behavior generates a good Samaritan dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduce the effect and can lead to an outcome which is Pareto-superior to the outcome under a Nash equilibrium with no government taxation and transfers.
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers
Glazer, Amihai (author) / Kondo, Hiroki (author)
2014
Article (Journal)
English
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