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A platform for research: civil engineering, architecture and urbanism
Novel Tendering Perspective for Encouraging Bidder Effort in PPP Projects
For PPP projects, the lowest price is not the top criteria for bidding winning, instead, the quality issue is a leading concern by the employer or government. Thus, contractors need to spend a lot of effort and expense in the bidding stage to balance profitability and quality, in order to reduce incurring costs in the construction phase. Encouraging high effort of the tenderer in the procurement stage is a critical problem based on the owner's perspective. Whereas, bid compensation is one of the suggestions which should be analyzed the feasibility in many scenarios. In this paper, the objective is to assess how to use effectively bid compensation in a particular case that has involving the owner, strong contractor, and normal contractor. Game-theoretic is applied to set up the modeling concept of bid compensation, as well as, explain strategic interaction between players. To solve the model is to solve the Nash Equilibrium solution. For purposes, this research should compare among models with the increasing number of bidders to provide the effectiveness of the bid compensation decision by the owner. Moreover, it will also be measured the weight of bid compensation amount that impacts to depth investing of bidder’s choice.
Novel Tendering Perspective for Encouraging Bidder Effort in PPP Projects
For PPP projects, the lowest price is not the top criteria for bidding winning, instead, the quality issue is a leading concern by the employer or government. Thus, contractors need to spend a lot of effort and expense in the bidding stage to balance profitability and quality, in order to reduce incurring costs in the construction phase. Encouraging high effort of the tenderer in the procurement stage is a critical problem based on the owner's perspective. Whereas, bid compensation is one of the suggestions which should be analyzed the feasibility in many scenarios. In this paper, the objective is to assess how to use effectively bid compensation in a particular case that has involving the owner, strong contractor, and normal contractor. Game-theoretic is applied to set up the modeling concept of bid compensation, as well as, explain strategic interaction between players. To solve the model is to solve the Nash Equilibrium solution. For purposes, this research should compare among models with the increasing number of bidders to provide the effectiveness of the bid compensation decision by the owner. Moreover, it will also be measured the weight of bid compensation amount that impacts to depth investing of bidder’s choice.
Novel Tendering Perspective for Encouraging Bidder Effort in PPP Projects
Lecture Notes in Civil Engineering
Reddy, J. N. (editor) / Wang, Chien Ming (editor) / Luong, Van Hai (editor) / Le, Anh Tuan (editor) / Pham, Vu Hong Son (author) / Phan, Kim Anh (author)
2022-09-21
13 pages
Article/Chapter (Book)
Electronic Resource
English
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